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Abstract
In this paper, we empirically test the role that religious and political institutions
play in the accumulation of human capital. Using a new data set on literacy in
colonial India, we find that Muslim literacy is negatively correlated with the
proportion of Muslims in the district, although we find no similar result for Hindu
literacy. We employ a theoretical model which suggests that districts which
experienced a more recent collapse of Muslim political authority had more
powerful and better funded religious authorities, who established religious schools
which were less effective at promoting literacy on the margin than state schools.
We test this hypothesis econometrically, finding that the period of Muslim
political collapse has a statistically significant effect on Muslim literacy while
controlling for it eliminates the significance of the proportion of Muslims on
Muslim literacy. This suggests that the “long hand of history” has played some
role in subsequent differences in human capital formation through the persistence
of institutions discouraging literacy.

We are extremely grateful for detailed comments provided by Murat Iyigun and Karen Clay. We also wish to thank
participants in workshops at UC-Davis, the 2009 ASREC Conference, and the 2009 Social Science History
Association Meetings. All mistakes are our own.

I. INTRODUCTION
Social scientists have long recognized the important relationship between education and
economic growth. More educated societies often have higher worker productivity, greater life
expectancy and are also quicker to adopt new technologies (Schultz 1983; Becker 1964; Drèze
and Sen 1998).1 Despite the numerous social and private benefits of education, enrollment and
literacy, however, vary dramatically across countries, religions and social groups. A large
majority of the citizens of developed countries acquired functional literacy by the early 20th
century, while citizens of developing countries such as Chad and India are still struggling with
literacy rates of 48% and 52% respectively. Even within countries, there are significant
differences in human capital accumulation between groups such as blacks and whites in the
Unites States (Margo 1990; Hanushek, Kaln, and Rivkin 2004; Fryer and Austen-Smith 2005).
To account for differences in educational development, some scholars note the role of
government policies (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Lindert 2004; Galor and Moav 2006; Rajan
2009), while a more recent literature emphasizes the historical importance of religion and
religious norms that either constrain or encourage religious groups to acquire literacy at a higher
rate relative to other religious groups living in the same region (Becker and Woessmann 2008,
2009; Botticini and Eckstein 2005, 2007). Our paper relates to this broader literature by studying
historical differences in educational attainment between the two main religious groups of India—
Hindus and Muslims.2
Average Muslim literacy was slightly below average Hindu literacy in the colonial period
and the variance in Muslim literacy was also lower than Hindu literacy (in 1911, the male Hindu
literacy rate was 12.8% and the male Muslim literacy rate was 12.0%). However, there was
1

There is vast literature on human capital, growth and development such as Lucas (1988), Barro (1991), Mankiw,
and Romer and Weil (1992) among many others.
2
Ghurye (1961), Srinivas (1998) and Borooah and Iyer (2005) have also commented on literacy differences in India.
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tremendous heterogeneity between provinces. For example, in Bengal 21.1% of Hindu males
were able to read and write in any language as compared to only 10.9% of Muslim males. But, in
provinces such as Madras and the United Provinces, Muslims enjoyed comparable or even higher
literacy than Hindus. Female literacy was very low for both religious groups, but the provincial
patterns are similar to those for male literacy.
This paper uses the earliest reliable data on literacy and a theoretical model to explore
why Hindus and Muslims had different literacy rates under the British. The difference in literacy
is a puzzle, because it appears to be a function not only of demographics and economic
conditions, but also of the share of Muslims in a district.3 Using data from the 1911 and 1921
census, we find that districts with more Muslims had lower literacy rates. The British were
keenly aware of the differences and actually devoted more resources to education in Muslim
districts, yet seemingly to no avail.
Our model explains this pattern by examining the incentives of Muslim religious
authorities, political authorities and the citizens. Specifically, we argue that where Muslim rule in
India collapsed more recently, Muslim religious authorities were stronger vis-à-vis the British.
This is due to the legitimizing role that religious authorities have historically played for Muslim
political authorities, a relationship that is an exogenous remnant of the birth of Islam and the type
of institutions that it encouraged (for more, see Rubin 2009). The model suggests that areas
where Muslim political authorities collapsed more recently had stronger religious authorities that
were better able to compete for Muslim students with the British. These authorities attracted

3

Our results bear a striking resemblance to other studies that have found similar negative effects on the educational
attainment of minority groups living in areas heavily populated by their own group such as blacks in the United
States (Margo 1990; Hanushek, Kaln, and Rivkin 2004). While the explanations for some of these findings in US
studies are related to differences in the supply of schooling, it could also be related to differential preferences within
minority groups living in non-minority versus minority areas (Fryer and Austen-Smith 2005). We concentrate
primarily on the former type of explanation in this paper.
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more Muslims to schools with religious curricula that, on the margin, were less effective at
promoting literacy.
Our model thus implies that the share of Muslims in a district may merely proxy for the
historical situation in which certain Muslim-dominant regions established institutions that
discouraged literacy. If this is true, then areas where Muslim rule collapsed a longer time ago
should have more Muslim students attending secular (public) schools and thus the fraction of
Muslims should contribute less (if at all) to lower literacy in these districts. We test this
hypothesis by controlling for the period of Muslim collapse using three dummy variables:
districts where Muslim rule collapsed prior to 1765, when Muslim rule fell in parts of the
northern and eastern areas of India; 1765 to 1805, when Muslim rule collapsed in some of the
southern and northern regions; and post-1805, when Muslim rule collapsed in the northern and
western areas (Robinson 1982).
Though this is admittedly a noisy proxy, we find that a more recent collapse has a
negative and statistically significant effect on Muslim literacy. Moreover, once we control for the
period of Muslim collapse, the presence of other Muslims has no statistically significant effect
on Muslim literacy. This more nuanced approach which incorporates the effects of institutions on
actions and outcomes thus provides a more complete picture of both the relationship between
Hindu and Muslim literacy in this period and, more generally, the relationship between
institutions and differences in human capital formation between groups.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EDUCATION, COLONIZATION, AND LITERACY
Beginning in the mid-19th century, the former indigenous system of Indian schooling was
largely replaced by a new state system of schooling introduced by the East India Company and
developed further by the colonial government after the East India Company’s rule came to an
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end in 1857. Schools were of two types under the former indigenous system: elite religious
schools for students interested in a lifetime of higher education and local elementary schools
where village boys were taught the 3 R’s in the vernacular medium. The religious schools were
differentiated by religion (Hindu or Muslim) with upper caste Brahman teachers and pupils
dominating the Hindu (i.e. Sanskrit) religious schools, although Hindus did occasionally teach at
some of the Muslim schools (madrassas). The local schools also encompassed Qur’an schools
(i.e. maktabs) where Muslim boys learned to read the Qur’an. Some historians suggest that 8 to
12 percent of the male population was literate, but we interpret the estimates with caution, as a
systematic enumeration of literacy did not begin until the early 20th century.4
Under the British system, publicly financed and managed schools (government and local
board schools) functioned alongside privately managed aided and unaided schools. Private aided
schools received public subsidies despite being privately managed, while private unaided schools
did not receive any public money.5 Privately managed schools came under the authority of the
state school system because they conformed to official education standards and their students
were allowed to take public examinations.
At the primary level, a smaller proportion of the schools were pure public schools as
compared to the hybrid public-private aided schools and private unaided schools. The proportion,
however, varied significantly across provinces with Bombay having a large number of pure
public schools and Bengal having a large number of aided and unaided schools (Chaudhary
2009b). Although many of the former indigenous schools disappeared over this period, some
were successfully converted into public aided schools and the remaining were classified as
4

See Nurullah and Naik (1951) and Basu (1982) for details. Basu (1982) suggests that literacy was more
commonplace among Brahmans and other upper caste males. Unfortunately, there is no systematic data available to
gauge the spread of schooling or estimate the degree of literacy in the population.
5
See Progress of Education, Quinquennial Reviews (volumes 1897-1927). See Nurullah and Naik (1951), Basu
(1974), and Ghosh (2000) for a historical examination of colonial Indian education.

4

private unrecognized schools. According to one British official, competition with state schools
hastened the decline of better quality indigenous schools, especially the Muslim religious
maktabs and madrassas (Leitner 1991).
The emphasis on both public and private schools is also reflected in the composition of
educational spending in this period. Public sources of revenues represented 50 percent of total
spending on education, increasing to 60 percent by the 1940s, while fees and private
contributions accounted for the remaining 50 percent. Differences in land revenues were
primarily responsible for differences in public revenues both across and within provinces. In
general, the eastern provinces of Bengal and Bihar had lower public spending compared to other
provinces because they received lower land revenues due to the Permanent Settlement of 1793
that fixed land revenues in cash for perpetuity (Chaudhary 2009b).
Beginning in the 1880s, primary education was decentralized to local district councils,
who levied an additional tax on land revenues (known as the land cess or local cess) to cover
spending on local public services such as education, infrastructure and medical services. Despite
the decentralization, district councils had limited fiscal independence to set new taxes or alter the
existing tax rates on land revenues. The tax rate was fixed for districts within the same province
(6.25% on average), but did vary across provinces. Moreover, the revenues were fairly inelastic
because land revenue assessments were revised every 20 to 30 years in non-Permanent
Settlement districts. Over time provincial governments also distributed grants to district councils
especially targeted toward improving the quality and quantity of rural primary schools. Both
public and private primary schools relied heavily on fees, although public school fees decreased
over time as more public money became available.6

6

See Chaudhary (2009a, 2009b) for details on the provision of education in British India.
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As the new system of education developed over the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a
dramatic increase in spending, number of schools per-capita, and enrollment rates (Chaudhary
2009b). Per-capita spending increased ten-fold between 1881 and 1931 from 95 to 1000 rupees
per 1000 persons and enrollment rates increased to 30 percent of the school age population by
1931. The improvements in spending and enrollment, however, did not translate into literacy
gains and less than 10 percent of the population of British India could read and write by 1931.7
Yet, the averages for British India mask the substantial heterogeneity across regions and
across religions. Among Hindus, literacy patterns generally followed the social hierarchy of the
caste system with Brahmans (the traditional upper castes) enjoying above average literacy
compared to the lower castes. There were also significant differences in enrollment and literacy
between Hindus and Muslims. Muslim literacy was lower on average than Hindu literacy and
Hindu-Muslim enrollment differentials were large at the secondary and post-secondary level.
Official reports often point to religion and poverty to account for the relative educational
backwardness of Muslims. For example, the Fifth Quinquennial review (p. 282) states,
the backwardness [of Muslims] is attributable partly to poverty, partly to
indifference, and partly to their educational wants not being the same as those of
the remainder of the population amongst whom they live. They require their
children to learn the Koran by rote at an age when other children are beginning to
make progress in secular education, and they have a preference for the use of
Urdu as a medium of instruction, even when it is not the vernacular language of
the locality. Both these causes operate to make the common schools less attractive
to Muhammadans than to members of other creeds and also to make it more
difficult for Government to provide schools suited to their special needs.
Colonial policies tried to bridge the gap between the two religions by offering
scholarships to Muslim students and public subsidies to indigenous Muslim religious schools that
were willing to introduce secular education. But, they often faced heavy resistance from local
7

To account for this discrepancy between enrollment and literacy, British officials frequently noted the general
wastage and inefficiency of the Indian education system. See Progress of Education, Tenth Quinquennial Review
(1927-32).
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Muslim communities that did not view the new state schools in the same positive light as
Hindus. A small minority of British officials blamed colonial educational policies themselves,
suggesting that they may have inadvertently reduced the quality of indigenous religious schools.
In this view, increased competition from state schools diminished the quality of indigenous
schools because there was no comparable state alternative for Muslim families seeking to
educate their children in Urdu and the local vernacular (Leitner 1991). Although later colonial
efforts were partially successful in raising Muslim primary school enrollment, Hindu-Muslim
differences in both secondary school enrollment and literacy persisted till the end of the Raj.
Why did these differences in enrollment and literacy exist and continue to persist over the
colonial period? Were the British correct in attributing the differences to the relative poverty of
Muslims as well as a difference in “educational wants”? Numerous factors may have caused
these differences. In the following sections we attempt to isolate these factors, employing a
unique data set of Hindu and Muslim literacy in the early twentieth century.
III. DATA DESCRIPTION
For the empirical analysis, we assemble a new dataset merging information from the
Indian censuses of 1911 and 1921 to data reported in the Indian District Gazetteers. The data
cover all districts in the provinces of Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Central
Province and Berar, Madras, Punjab and United Provinces.8 These provinces jointly account for
more than 95 percent of the population of British India. We extract data on the social,
educational, occupational, and developmental structure of each district from the colonial
censuses and rely on the Indian district gazetteers for the number of schools, pupils, income and
land tax revenues, and public spending on rural primary education.
8

The analysis excludes the pure urban cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras because they were so different
socially and economically from the largely rural districts of British India. We also exclude the remote North
Western Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and Burma.
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Although literacy was enumerated in earlier censuses, we begin in 1911 because the
definition and enumeration of literates in previous censuses was inconsistent across provinces.
Beginning in 1911, a uniform definition of literacy was adopted whereby an individual that could
both read and write in any language was enumerated as literate. Official discussions suggest that
the definition was clearly understood by the enumerators and the literacy data are considered
reasonably accurate.9 However, the censuses do note that Muslims were occasionally frustrated
by this definition because even though they could read certain passages from the Qur’an, the
enumerators recorded them as illiterate because they could not write.10 We focus on measures of
total literacy in 1911 and 1921 disaggregated for Hindus and Muslims.11
In addition to literacy, we use the 1911 and 1921 census to construct measures of
development such as urban population share, population density, and the district occupational
structure. Scholars have suggested that some of the smaller occupational categories may be
inaccurate, and hence we focus on broader categories: the share of the population supported by
agriculture, commerce, industry, and professionals. Although the census does not report districtlevel occupation data by religion, we used the provincial breakdown of occupational categories
by religion to construct crude district-level measures of the share of Muslims and Hindus
supported by the four main occupations. This assigns each district within the province the same
religion-occupation share and we use these controls for robustness checks. We also extracted
information on the population share of important caste and religious groups: Muslims,
9

In the pre-1911 censuses no specific guidelines were given to enumerators to test for literacy, which led to
substantial variation in the methods adopted across provinces. Although officials point to certain problems with the
post-1911 enumeration such as enumerators on occasion adopting school standards, they do indicate, “the simple
criterion laid down was easily understood and sensibly interpreted” (Census of India 1921, Volume I – Report,
Chapter VIII).
10
Although this may lead to measurement error in the Muslim literacy rate data, there is no reason to believe that
this error would differ in high-Muslim versus low-Muslim districts. If anything, measurement error of this type
should make it more difficult to find a negative effect of Muslims on Muslim literacy because districts with more
Muslims were more likely to have Muslim census enumerators that may have been sympathetic to this argument.
11
We also do robustness checks using gender specific and cohort specific literacy (population aged 10 to 20).
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Christians, and tribes. Moreover, we constructed a measure of caste and religious fragmentation
to capture the level of diversity that has been linked to an under-provision of public goods in a
variety of contexts including British India (Chaudhary 2009a).
From the district gazetteers, we extracted data on public educational spending by rural
district boards and income tax revenues.12 Income taxes and district board expenditures were
missing for several districts in the 1921 cross-section. We used the 1911 income taxes for the
1921 cross-section in provinces where this data was missing since the variation within provinces
is similar although the levels may have increased between 1911 and 1921.13 Income taxes are a
crude proxy of district income and should be interpreted with caution because these taxes were
levied on a small share of individuals working in the formal sector of the economy. Nonetheless,
this is the best available local measure of historical income.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables. Hindu and Muslim literacy
rates as well as the population share of each religion are shown separately by province in the top
half of the table, while the different socio-economic variables are shown by year in the bottom
half. Overall literacy was very low in British India both among Hindus and Muslims averaging
around 7 percent across districts and religions. The variance in literacy, however, was lower
among Muslims than Hindus. The literacy averages mask the substantial regional variation with
Muslim literacy ranging from as high as 12 percent in the southern province of Madras to as low
as 2.6 percent in the northern province of Punjab. Some of this variation is related to the Muslim
population share. For example, Muslims enjoy above average literacy in provinces where they

12

Rural districts boards were constituted in the early 1880s and managed the provision of local public goods such as
infrastructure, education, and medical services at the district level.
13
Likewise, we only use 1911 district board expenditures in the analysis, because public spending changed in this
decade due to the Montague Chelmsford reforms, which ushered in the period of Dyarchy under which British
administrators worked alongside elected Indian ministers in provincial legislatures. See Kumar (1982) for an
overview of the colonial fiscal system.
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form a smaller share of the population such as Madras and Central Provinces (4.2 and 6.7 percent
respectively) versus provinces such as Bengal and Punjab where they comprise almost fifty
percent of the population. We explore this relationship between Hindu-Muslim literacy and their
respective population shares in more detail in the next section.14
IV. LITERACY RATES AND RELIGIOUS POPULATION
The summary statistics shown in Table 1 suggest that the Muslim population share may
influence Hindu and Muslim literacy. To examine this relationship, we run a baseline regression
relating the share of the Hindu and Muslim population to Hindu and Muslim literacy in 1911 and
1921. Table 2 reports the findings for 1911 in the top panel and for 1921 in the bottom panel. It
is evident that the Muslim population is strongly correlated with the educational performance of
both Hindus and Muslims. Columns 1 and 2 suggest that a larger proportion of Muslims has a
positive and statistically significant impact on Hindu literacy but a negative impact on Muslim
literacy in both cross-sections. A 10 percentage point increase in fraction Muslim is associated
with a 1 percentage point increase in 1911 Hindu literacy and a 1.4 percentage point decrease in
1911 Muslim literacy.15 Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that a strong negative relationship exists
between Muslim literacy and the presence of Muslims.
To test whether positive regional selection is driving the results on fraction Muslim,
columns 3 and 4 control for province fixed effects to focus on the within province variation. The
correlation between fraction Muslim and both Hindu and Muslim literacy remains negative and
14

Similar to literacy, other socio-economic indicators such as urbanization and the share of the commercial
population are relatively stagnant between 1911 and 1921. Moreover, the low levels of urbanization and
commercialization highlight the remarkable dominance of agriculture in the early 20th century Indian economy
(agriculture is the omitted occupational group in the table).
15
Our results are robust to using negative binomial regressions. We also tested for non-linearity in the relationship
between literacy and religious population share and found that there is indeed a significant amount of non-linearity –
the coefficient on the fraction Muslim squared term is frequently positive and significant in regressions where
Muslim literacy is the dependent variable. We decided not to include these regressions, which are available upon
request, because they provide a less straight-forward interpretation of the effect of Muslim population on Muslim
literacy.
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statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We find similar patterns on age and genderspecific literacy.16
Why does the presence of Muslims affect literacy? The decision to invest in literacy at an
individual level involves a simple cost and benefit calculation. If the monetary and non-monetary
benefits or returns to literacy (higher wages, social status, and so forth) exceed the costs
(opportunity cost of time, school fees, and the like), then an individual will invest in literacy.
This decision-making process is a function of individual characteristics such as ability, family
background, parental education, and social and religious affiliation as well as community or
district characteristics such as economic conditions and public educational investments. Literacy
rates at the district-level are thus a function of the aggregate costs and benefits of literacy.
Given this framework, one obvious explanation of our findings on Muslim literacy is that
fraction Muslim is capturing some aspect of lower returns to literacy for Muslims. For example,
if Muslims lived in less developed or poorer districts, then fraction Muslim may just be capturing
the negative effects of poverty on education. To test whether fraction Muslim is simply a proxy
for lower returns to Muslim literacy, we include a variety of variables to capture differences in
the costs and benefits of literacy such as district occupational structure, social heterogeneity,
income and development.
Another potential explanation for these patterns is the interaction between colonial
policies and fraction Muslim. British officials were cognizant of the substantial differences
between Hindu and Muslim educational outcomes, and they adopted a variety of policies to
increase enrollment rates and literacy in Muslim dominant districts. As part of these policies,
Muslim students were eligible for scholarships and reduced fees in public schools, and the
colonial government established a number of schools in Muslim majority districts (Progress of
16

These results are available upon request.
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Education in India, Quinquennial Reviews, 1897-1927). This suggests that colonial policies
would make it less likely to find a negative coefficient on the fraction Muslim variable in the
Muslim literacy regressions because of the larger presence of public schools.
Table 3 includes our measures of income, development and per-capita public educational
expenditures by rural district boards as control variables in the regressions. Including these
controls reduces the coefficient on fraction Muslim by almost 40% in the inter-province
comparisons, but the magnitudes are not very different in the within province comparisons. The
results on fraction Muslim also hold for literacy rates disaggregated by gender and the 10 to 20
aged cohort (available upon request). In other unreported regressions, we controlled for crude
demographic and occupational differences by religion, and the result relating the presence of
Muslims to lower literacy remained robust.17
VI. LITERACY AND LEGITIMACY: THE LASTING EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS
We can draw two important conclusions from the evidence presented thus far. First, a
larger presence of Muslims negatively influences Muslim literacy but there is no comparable
effect of Hindus on Hindu literacy. Second, differences in private returns or differences in public
spending by the colonial government alone are not completely driving these patterns because
fraction Muslim is negative and statistically significant even after we include public spending
and various proxies for returns. How then can we explain these patterns?

17

Other than Bengal, the occupational breakdown of Hindus and Muslims is very similar to their share in the
population. In Bengal, Muslims formed a larger share of agricultural laborers but our results are robust to excluding
Bengal. Bengal’s occupational differences relate to the historical conversion of Hindus into Islam, which began in
the early medieval period, with the vast majority of Indian Muslims being converts and not immigrants. Although
scholars have offered several explanations for the conversions, there is no consensus on the dominant reason for
conversion (Eaton 2003). For our purpose, negative selection into Islam could bias our results but we address the
possibility of negative selection into Islam by controlling for province fixed effects and occupational differences
across districts. Although the regressions do not completely rule out negative selection or low returns as an
explanation, it appears unlikely that returns or selection alone are driving the fraction Muslim result.
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In this section, we draw on the institutional history of the rise and fall of Muslim political
power in India to provide an alternative explanation for the observed patterns. We present a
theoretical model supported by historical evidence which suggests that Muslim religious
authorities were stronger and better funded in areas where Muslim political authority had
recently collapsed, allowing them to better compete with British state schools despite a
curriculum that was more religious in nature and perhaps less focused on the type of skills that
promote literacy.
The poor quality of indigenous religious schools, both Hindu and Muslim, in the early
20th century is often discussed in the official documents but the specific reasons for their poor
quality are often debated (Nurullah and Naik 1961). Religious schools may have declined in
quality due to increased competition for resources (teachers, for example) from the new British
state schools or perhaps their religious nature rendered them less effective at promoting basic
literacy. We do not assume that the religious schools were less effective at teaching literacy, but
instead show that this is an equilibrium outcome.
An implication of our argument is that there was a strong disincentive for Muslims to
attain skills that promote literacy in regions where Muslim political collapse happened more
recently. In these regions, Muslim religious authorities had more influence over the choices of
the population, and thus the religious schools were on the margin more attractive. In the model,
we suggest that going to religious school provides some benefit which is increasing in the
influence of the religious authority. Hence, we suggest that Muslims attained lower literacy in
areas that collapsed more recently for three reasons: i) religious schools, which were worse at
promoting literacy than public schools, were more attractive due to the higher level of religious
capital attained by the religious authorities; ii) religious schools were better funded (via private

13

donations) in areas where religious authorities had more religious capital (namely, those that
collapsed more recently); iii) religious authorities could increase the portion of the curriculum
that was religious in these areas – implicitly decreasing the effectiveness of the school with
regards to literacy – without losing as many students. We suggest that this explains Kozlowski’s
(1985, p. 64-65) observation:
In the second half of the nineteenth century … Hindus began to abandon some of
the traditions of the Mughal elite and enrol (sic) in schools established on the
British model which concentrated on learning English. … [D]espite the
competition from “modern” schools, many Muslims continued to send their sons
to schools which taught the old curriculum by the old methods of recitation and
memorization.
To shed more light on the causal connections, we model the interactions between the
relevant players over the period encompassing the height of the Mughal Empire through the
arrival of the British. Consider a game played between four types of players over many periods.
The players are a local Muslim religious authority, a Muslim political authority, N local citizenry
(who are both Hindu and Muslim), and a British authority. The game is played over many
periods and has five fundamental features:
1) The Muslim political authority depends on religious authorities for legitimacy
2) Muslim religious authorities offer education to Muslim citizens
3) The Muslim political authority stops playing the game in an exogenously determined
period t1
4) In period t2 (> t1), the British authority enters the game and offers educational services
which compete with those offered by the religious authority. The religious authority
has a local monopoly on educational services in all periods before t2

14

5) Investments in education map onto a probability of attaining literacy based on some
production function, whose inputs are the degree to which the curriculum is religious,
the expenditure per student, and the socio-economic conditions of the citizenry

Play Before the Collapse of the Political Authority
The political authority, religious authority, and citizens play the game for t1 periods. The
religious authority purchases legitimacy, L, from the religious authority for a transfer Tt, where
periods are denoted with subscript t. This reflects the fact that Muslim rulers in India, especially
the Mughals, had roots closely tied to previous Middle Eastern empires, sharing institutions,
learned languages, ideology, and ruling personnel (Metcalf 1982; Eaton 1993; Kozlowski 1995).
Like other Islamic rulers, Mughal leadership was based on what Greif (2002) calls “faith-based
legitimacy”, whereby political rule was legitimate only when it complied with Islamic dictates.18
This entailed a situation in which Muslim religious authorities had some power vis-à-vis political
authorities, though the latter dominated for much of the Mughal reign.
One way that this dynamic manifested itself was through significant grants given to
religious authorities and institutions by political authorities in order to legitimize their power
(Habib 1963; Kozlowski 1985, 1995; Eaton 1993). The funding of religious schools has always
been a legitimizing force in Islam (Kozlowski 1995; Berkey 2007).19 The religious leaders who
ran these institutions were the primary grantees of the state, and the bestowal of grants (madad-i
ma’āsh) to religious authorities was so ubiquitous that the grants were eventually named a’imma,

18

Anderson (1993) and Eaton (1993) stress the importance of abiding by Muslim dictates for maintaining legitimacy
amongst Islamic leaders in India. For more on the role that religious authority has played in legitimizing the state in
the Islamic world, see Greif (2002), Rubin (2009), Coşgel, Miceli, and Ahmed (2009), and Coşgel, Miceli, and
Rubin (2009). For more on Hinduism as a legitimizing force in India in Colonial India, see Buultjens (1986).
19
In addition to mosques, Mughal authorities also supported sufis and shrines, in turn encouraging donations by the
nobility, gentry, and merchants (Kozlowski 1985).
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or religious leader. In turn, religious authorities were expected to be the state’s most ardent
apologists (Habib 1963).20 Kozlowski (1985, p. 22) suggests that Mughal rulers supported
mosques so that “the name of the sultan was invoked during the Friday prayers, [meaning that]
Muslims heard weekly a proclamation of their ruler’s piety.” Indeed, the emperor Jahangir
(1605-1627) called the religious leaders the “Army of Prayer” and reportedly believed that this
army was as important as his real army (Habib 1963).
In the model, the political authority also purchases legitimacy from other, un-modeled
sources such as the military or nobility. Hence, the return from religious legitimacy is a function
of the fraction of Muslims, m, living in the area – where there are more Muslims, religious
legitimacy is more effective. In each period, the political authority chooses a transfer Tt to
maximize its utility:
(1)

UP = L(Tt, m) – Tt,

where L1 > 0, L11 < 0, L2 > 0, and L12 > 0. It is straight-forward to see that the optimal transfer,
T*, is an increasing function of the fraction of Muslims (m).
Assume that the amount the religious authority spends on educating Muslims is
increasing in the transfer. The transfer gives the religious authority the ability to accumulate
"religious capital", Rt, in the community – by allowing it to provide education, build shrines and
mosques, engage in conspicuous religious consumption, and the like – which is formally defined
as:21
(2)

t

Rt = ∑ δ t − j Tt ,
j =1

20

The bestowal of grants varied from emperor to emperor. Akbar significantly reduced the grants available to
religious authorities, but his successors – Jahangir and more notably Aurangzeb – restored and even expanded many
of these grants (Habib 1963).
21
Our definition of religious capital is different than the one employed in Iannaccone (1990), who analyzes religious
capital in the context of congregations and religious participation. We are concerned with the “capital” accumulated
by religious authorities as a result of political sponsorship and its provision of educational services.
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where δ ∈ (0,1) is a depreciation rate.22
The religious authority derives utility from two different sources: offering religious
education and attaining religious capital. Its utility from offering schooling is increasing in both
the number of students choosing the religious school ( N tR ) and the degree to which the
curriculum is religious (rt). When rt = 1, the curriculum is entirely religious, when rt = 0, the
curriculum is entirely secular, and the curriculum is increasingly religious when rt ∈ (0,1) .
Meanwhile, the utility the religious authority receives from religious capital is greater when the
curriculum is more religious, as a more religious curriculum improves its power vis-à-vis the
citizenry and the political authority in the present and in the future. In other words, the religious
authority chooses a curriculum rt to optimize the following:
(3)

UR = u(rt, N tR ) + w(rt, Rt).

Where u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u11 < 0, u12 > 0, w1 > 0, w2 > 0, and w12 > 0.
The inputs into the literacy production function are the amount spent on education per
citizen, the economic opportunities available to each citizen, and the degree to which the
curriculum is religious, rt.23 The literacy production function differs for each citizen. Each citizen

i has economic opportunity, xi,t, which is distributed over some smooth, continuous cdf G(·). The
return to education is increasing in xi,t. That is, xi,t can be thought of as the socio-economic
conditions faced by citizen i. The literacy production function, whose inputs are the religiosity of
the school, the per-student transfer, and the economic opportunities of the citizen, is represented
22

It is possible that religious capital does not always erode over time. Indeed, events such as the Iranian Revolution
and the contemporary rise of Islamist power in Turkey challenge this idea. However, such events are generally the
result of investment in religious capital, not some process whereby religious capital accumulates over time
independent of investment. Our assumption merely entails that, all else being equal, religious capital deteriorates
over time.
23
Our model is based on standard assumptions used in the literature on education production functions except for
the religious curriculum parameter. See Glewwe (2002) for an overview of the education production literature
pertaining to developing countries.
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 T

by F  rt , tR ; xi ,t  , where F1 < 0, F11 < 0, F2 > 0, F3 > 0, and F13 < 0. The latter condition
 Nt


means that people with better socio-economic opportunities receive a greater marginal return
from a more secular education.24
Meanwhile, each citizen j chooses a school, k ∈ {B, R}, to maximize an economic return
(the literacy production function) and a religious return, v(·). B denotes the British school, which
is not available before period t2, and R is the religious school. That is, citizens choose school k to
optimize:
(4)



fk
F  rt k , t k ; xi ,t  + v rt k , Rtk ,
Nt



(

)

where the superscript k denotes the school k ∈ {B, R} in question, f represents the funding
available to school k (where f = T for the religious school), v1 > 0, v11 < 0, v2 > 0, v12 > 0, v(0, ·)
= 0, and N tk is the number of students choosing school k. Assume that, given

ftk
(per student
N tk

funding) and Rtk (religious capital), there is some optimal offering of religious curriculum, r*,
for each citizen. It follows that r* is decreasing in socio-economic opportunity, xi,t.
Solving this model for periods prior to t1 is straight-forward. All N citizens choose the
religious school (which is their only option), the religious authority chooses a fully religious
curriculum r* = 1 in all periods (since citizens choose the religious school no matter the choice
of the religious authority), and the political authority chooses transfer T* as defined above. For
simplicity, we ignore the choices made by Hindu citizens through period t2. The results are not
24

One could argue that the assumption that F13 < 0 is an Islam-specific one. Indeed, recent studies suggest that the
spread of Protestantism (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 2009) and Judaism (Botticini and Eckstein 2005, 2007)
improved human capital. However, our religious curriculum variable should be interpreted as the portion of the
curriculum that is religious and thus not directly aimed at increasing non-religious human capital. Our model
suggests that if this variable is greater in an Islamic setting, this is a result of endogenous processes stemming from
the institutional setting, not an exogenous attribute of Islam.
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affected if we were to assume that Hindus attend Muslim schools or they attend some other type
of (unmodeled) school.

Play Between the Collapse of the Political Authority and the Arrival of the British
In period t1 the political authority exits the game. In period t2 (which is after t1), the
British enter the game. In between these two periods, only the religious authorities and the
citizens play the game. After t1, the religious authorities receive funding from a small group of
unmodeled citizens. Indeed, following the collapse of Muslim rule in India some government
aid was available to the religious authorities (especially princely grants), but these were often
small and irregular. In response, religious authorities created networks of local donors whose
contributions made up a majority of the authorities’ funds (Metcalf 1982, ch. 3). This donor base
also allowed the religious authorities to avoid British grant-in-aids, which would have carried the
taint of a non-Muslim source and would have given the British control over curriculum (Metcalf
1982, ch.3). This permitted religious learning to remain the core of the curriculum, since the
British policy of religious neutrality meant that formal religious study was supposed to be
excluded from instruction in publicly funded schools (Zaman 1999).
The religious authority's ability to raise funds, w, from this group of citizens is increasing
in its religious capital, Rt. Assume that w < T for all values of w; that is, the religious authority
was better funded by the political authority than from the group of citizens. This reflects the fact
that
Muslim princes of state …patronize[d] learning…[and] large landlords in the United
Provinces did dispense some of their wealth for religious causes. But such contributions
could never be as substantial as those of the days of Mughal rule, nor could they be as
certain in a period of economic, social, and administrative flux…Instead they created a
network of donors who formed a base … for financial support (Metcalf 1982, p. 96-97).
The religious capital accrued by the religious authority in these periods is:
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Rt = δ t −t1 Rt1 +

(5)

t

∑δ

t− j

( ).

w Rj

j =t1 +1

 w(Rt )

 . In equilibrium, all
The literacy production function of the religious school is F  rt ,
;
x
i
,
t
R

N
t



Muslim citizens choose the religious school and the religious authority chooses r* = 1 in all
periods. Again, we ignore the school choice of Hindus in these periods.

Play After the Arrival of the British
In period t2 the British enter the game, which is played until some end period t . The
British offer a secular school that competes with the religious school, which still receives
funding w(Rt). That is, the British offer a school where rt = 0. The British provide bt funds to
support the school. Although this is a simplifying assumption since purely public state schools
funded by the British functioned alongside public-private schools (i.e. aided schools), the publicprivate schools did receive public grants to cover up to half of their operating expenditure. This
 b

entails that the literacy production function of the British school is F  0, tB ; xi ,t  , where N tB is
 Nt


the number of students attending the British school.
For simplicity, assume that all Hindu citizens (fraction 1 – m) attend the British school.25
Muslim citizens choose between attending the British school and the religious school. The utility
derived by Muslims from attending the British school is merely the production function
 b

F  0, tB ; xi ,t  , since there is no religious return, and N tB = (1 − m )N + N tB , M where N tB , M
 Nt


denotes the number of Muslims choosing the British school. On the other hand, the return for

25

This is merely a simplifying assumption. Clearly, not all Hindus attended school and some Hindus attended
private schools. Incorporating these facts does not change the implications of the model.
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 w(Rt )

Muslims from attending the religious school is F  rt ,
; xi ,t  + v(rt , Rt ) . That is, for a given
R
Nt



level of rt, N tB , and N tR (assuming that N tB and N tR are large enough that citizens have an
infinitesimal effect on the production function), a Muslim citizen i chooses the British school if:
 b

 w(Rt )

F  0, tB ; xi ,t  − F  rt ,
; xi ,t  > v(rt , Rt ) .
R
Nt
 Nt




(6)

Assume that an internal equilibrium exists; that is, N tB > 0 and N tR > 0 . In equilibrium,

the production function condition F13 < 0 entails that there must be some threshold socioeconomic value x* such that all citizens with xi,t ≥ x* choose the British school and all citizens
with xi,t < x* choose the religious school. This entails that for the marginal citizen (defined as the
citizen whose socio-economic condition is xi,t = x*), the left-hand side of (6) equals the right
hand side. The equilibrium condition is NG (x *) = N tR = N − N tB , where G(·) is the cdf over which
xi,t is distributed.

It is clear that x* is decreasing in the amount of funds provided by the British, bt. The
relationship between x* and rt (the religiosity of the curriculum) is a little more complicated. At
sufficiently small levels of rt , x* is increasing in rt; an increase in rt means that the religious
school becomes more attractive since the increase in the religious return, v(rt, Rt), is greater than
the decrease in the literacy production function. This is the case when rt is smaller than r* (the
optimal offering of religious curriculum) for the marginal citizen. On the other hand, when rt >
r* for the marginal citizen, x* is decreasing in rt. Finally, the relationship between x* and

fraction of Muslims in the population (m) depends on the level of m, as an increase in m
decreases the number of Hindus attending British schools (thus increasing the returns for

21

Muslims) but also increases Rt (the religious capital) and thus increase the returns for Muslims
from attending religious schools.
Under reasonable assumptions on G(·) and F(·), there is an internal optimal choice of
religiosity of the curriculum (rt) for the religious authority, call it r**. This optimal choice is less
than in previous periods (where the religious authority chose a fully religious curriculum at r* =
1), meaning that competition from British schools improves the quality of the religious schools
with respect to literacy, although the religious schools do offer a differentiated, more religious,
product. Finally, after taking into account the religious authority's decision, it is clear that x* is
increasing in Rt.
Analysis and Testable Predictions

What does this model tell us in the context of colonial India? We are concerned with how
the interactions between the players affect literacy outcomes in the final period of the model, t ,
which can interpreted as the period our data covers (1911 and 1921). These interactions provide
testable predictions spelled out below.
Before summarizing the predictions, note that in equilibrium the British schools must be
more effective at promoting literacy than the Muslim schools. To see this, consider the case
where this is not true. If Muslim schools were more effective at promoting literacy, then all
Muslims would choose the religious school. This cannot be an equilibrium, however, because if
all Muslims choose the religious schools, then the religious authority has incentive to increase
the religiosity of the curriculum (rt) at least up to the point where the Muslim with the best socioeconomic opportunity (xi,t) is indifferent between the religious and the British school. At this
point, the British school must be more effective at promoting literacy, since the indifferent
citizen receives a religious return from attending the religious school. Moreover, this logic must
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also hold at greater levels of rt, since citizens do not view their decision as affecting the literacy
production function of the schools.
In other words, the outcome that British schools promoted literacy to a greater extent than
religious schools is endogenously derived in the model, following from the assumption that
religious citizens place some positive weight on a religious curriculum. And indeed, although in
reality the curriculum of the religious schools varied widely throughout India, anecdotal
evidence suggests that these schools encouraged the ability to read and write to a lesser extent
than the public schools established by colonial authorities. One reason commonly given for this
is the significance of oral transmission in Islamic history (the most important means by which
religious scholars maintained their monopoly on knowledge [Eaton 1993; Berkey 2007]), which
encouraged many of these schools to promote Qur’an memorization and recitation of other
religious sciences instead of skills associated with literacy (Kozlowski 1985).26 In fact, Eaton
(1993, p. 296) provides anecdotal evidence that many Indian mullas themselves could not read,
but that they were understood by the villagers to be tapping into a deeper, otherworldly source of
power.
The following predictions thus arise from the model:
Prediction #1: All else being equal, if the education expenditure by the British (bt) is sufficiently

larger than the funding of the religious schools (w), then the fraction of Muslims in the
population (m) is negatively correlated with the Muslim literacy rate.

26

This by no means entails that all Islamic schools discouraged literacy or even those that did never offered
anything in the curriculum which would promote literacy. Indeed, Metcalf (1982), Kozlowski (1985), and Zaman
(1999) show instances of Islamic schools which promoted literacy. However, on the margin, the probability of a
student becoming literate who attended a public funded school must have been greater than one who attended an
Islamic school, for reasons provided above. For example, the British formed the ill-fated Delhi College in 1825
because the private madrasahs spent too much time on the Qur’an and there was no regular system of attendance
(Metcalf 1982). The British did sponsor some madrasahs, as long as the content of the curriculum was deemed
sufficiently “useful” (Zaman 1999).
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Intuition: A sufficient condition for this prediction to hold is that the British school is better

funded than the religious school. Indeed, state schools on average were of much higher quality
with respect to infrastructure and instructors. Although there were informal public aided and
unaided schools run out of teachers’ houses or local temples, many of the pure public schools
had buildings. Moreover, many teachers in the public schools attended special training schools
before entry into teaching. The state schools were regularly reviewed to ensure they met some
satisfactory standards. In comparison, the indigenous schools were never reviewed and official
authorities had a difficult time even getting basic statistics on enrollment. By the early 20th
century, less than 10 percent of total pupils were enrolled in any of these schools. Both official
accounts and the historical literature suggest that by the early 20th century, religious schools were
of poor quality relative to the state schools (Quinquennial Reviews of Education, 1887-1927;
Nurullah and Naik 1961; Ghosh 2000).
To see why Prediction #1 holds, consider what happens to the equilibrium actions when
the fraction of Muslims (m) is increased by an infinitesimal amount. The direct effect is that the
funding for the religious school, w(Rt), and the citizens’ “religious return”, v(rt, Rt), increase, thus
increasing the attractiveness and the productivity (with respect to literacy) of the religious
school. Meanwhile, the fraction of Hindus decreases, so the British schools spend more per
citizen and are hence more productive.
The religious authority, however, has incentive to increase the degree to which the
curriculum is religious (rt) to a point where the religious school is worse for literacy than it was
before the increase in the fraction Muslim, m. To see this, consider the situation in which the
religious authority increases rt to the point where literacy is the same before and after the
increase in m. When British funding (bt) is sufficiently large, the increase in fraction Muslim
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entails that the religious return to attending the religious school, v(rt, Rt), increases by more than
the return from attending the British school. Thus, more students attend the religious school and
the religious authority has incentive to increase rt further, and both of these factors result in the
religious schools being worse for literacy after the increase in m (since there is less funding per
student and the curriculum is more religious). Although Muslim citizens who remain in the
British school after the increase in m have a higher probability of becoming literate, the rest of
the Muslim citizens have a lower probability of becoming literate – both those who switch from
the British to the religious school and those who were in the religious school before and after the
change in m. If the education expenditure by the British is sufficiently large, then the latter effect
outweighs the former and m is negatively correlated with the Muslim literacy rate. In other
words, this prediction entails that “fraction Muslim” should be negatively correlated with
Muslim literacy, but not necessarily due to any cultural reason of anything to do with the “nature
of Islam”.27 Instead, the correlation between fraction Muslim and Muslim literacy may be
spurious, as they may be related through the presence of historical Muslim educational
institutions and the collapse of Muslim rule.
Prediction #2: All else being equal, if the education expenditure by the British (bt) is sufficiently

larger than the funding of the religious schools (w), then the Muslim literacy rate is
positively correlated with the years (periods) since the collapse of the Muslim political
authority ( t - t1).
Intuition: Where Muslim collapse happens more distantly in the past, it is longer since Muslim

religious authorities played a legitimizing role. This, in turn, decreases the religious authority’s
27

It should be noted that the model cannot rule out culture as a determining factor in differential literacy rates.
However, as we suggest below, a purely cultural argument is tough to reconcile with regression results indicating
that the coefficient on “fraction Muslim” is greatly weakened and often insignificant after the period of Muslim
collapse is controlled for.

25

capital within the district as well as the funding bestowed on it by political authorities. As a
result, religious schools should be weaker in these areas and less able to compete with British
schools, which provided a stronger secular, but not religious, curriculum.
In terms of the model, religious capital (Rt) is decreasing in the number of periods since
the collapse of the political authority under the assumption that the transfer given by the political
authority, Tt, is greater than that given by the citizenry, w(Rt). Moreover, the degree of
depreciation of religious capital is increasing in the number of periods since the collapse of
political authority.
A decrease in religious capital (Rt) has a few effects related to literacy. First, it
encourages some Muslims to choose the British school, as the religious schools are now less
funded and the religious return, v(rt, Rt), is lower. Literacy for these citizens is thus increased.
However, Muslims who were already in the British school now get less funding, so their
probability of becoming literate decreases. Meanwhile, the Muslims who remain in the Muslim
school have a more poorly funded school, and thus have a lower probability of literacy. The
positive effects on literacy outweigh the negative effects when the British school is sufficiently
well-funded, as those already in the British school will not have their probability of becoming
literate greatly reduced but those moving to the British school have a significant increase in their
probability of becoming literate. This entails that the Muslim literacy rate is positively associated
with the number of periods since the collapse of the Muslim political authority.
In sum, this model proposes that the share of Muslims in the population may be
spuriously correlated with Muslim literacy. Instead of relying on a purely cultural argument, the
model suggests the possibility that religious schools were more attractive in regions where
religious authorities accumulated more religious capital in the past. These regions are often ones
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with a greater portion of Muslims (since this enticed Muslim rulers to purchase more legitimacy
from religious authorities) and a more recent collapse of Muslim political authority (since
religious authorities received more funding in such regions). It follows that religious authorities
may have been able to increase the degree to which the religious school's curriculum was based
on religion in these areas, thus diminishing the productivity of religious schools in promoting
literacy. It also encouraged more Muslims to enter the religious schools instead of the British
schools – diminishing Muslim literacy.28
Empirical Analysis

The argument presented in the model may help explain the finding that the Muslim
literacy rate is negatively associated with the presence of other Muslims. First, there is evidence
that regions with a more recent collapse of Mughal rule had larger Muslim populations. Districts
where Muslim rule collapsed before 1765 had a mean Muslim proportion of 21.3%, those where
Muslim rule collapsed between 1765-1805 had a mean Muslim proportion of 21.7%, while those
with a post-1805 collapse had a mean Muslim proportion of 34.2%. This suggests the possibility
that the coefficient on fraction Muslim in our previous regressions is merely a proxy for the
historical circumstance in which a recent collapse of Muslim rule entailed worse literacy for
Muslims.
28

Concerns with this model may include the number of years (or periods) before Muslim collapse is not endogenous
or that the fraction of Muslims in the population is not endogenous. The former may be endogenous because Muslim
political authorities were stronger where there were more Muslims and thus had a lower probability of collapse
where m was large. The latter may be endogenous because poor socio-economic opportunities (xi,t) may have
convinced some poor Hindus to convert to Islam, which was not encumbered by the rigid caste system. However,
endogenizing either of these phenomena would merely exacerbate the results enumerated above. The model predicts
that the fraction of Muslims in the population and "late collapse" are both negatively correlated with the Muslim
literacy rate. Hence, making the collapse date (t1) an increasing function of the fraction of Muslims in the population
(m) would merely strengthen Predictions #1 and #2. Moreover, if Hindus in poor socio-economic conditions
converted to Islam, then this should exacerbate prediction #1, since poor socio-economic conditions are assumed to
be negatively correlated with literacy (F3 > 0). That is, if the distribution of socio-economic conditions is more
skewed to the left for Muslims than Hindus, this means that we should see worse literacy rates where there are more
Muslims, although for a different reason than the one proposed in the model. On the other hand, if Hindus with good
socio-economic conditions converted to Islam, then the results of the model may change under some parameter sets.
However, our data shows little evidence of this type of selection.
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Can the differential timing in the collapse of Muslim rule across different parts of India
pick up any variation that we are not already picking up in the previous regressions? Throughout
the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, Muslim power collapsed in different places in the
subcontinent. The Mughal Empire was greatly weakened by the early eighteenth century
(especially after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707) and by the mid-eighteenth century was
replaced by a combination of Muslim successor states, Hindu kingdoms (most prominently the
Marathas) and the British East India Company.29 The first watershed event of British intrusion
occurred at the Battle of Plessey (1757), which was followed by the formal secession of Mughal
lands to the East India Company in Bengal and Bihar in 1765 (Datta 2003; Banerjee and Iyer
2005). Prior to 1765, Muslim rule collapsed not only in Bengal and Bihar but also to the
Maratha kingdom in parts of the northern and eastern areas of India (in parts of Orissa, Central
Provinces, Bombay, and Punjab).
The British expanded little in the decades following the accession of Bengal and Bihar.
From 1790-1805, however, the British nearly doubled their holdings in India, especially under
the aggressive tenure of Richard Wellesley (1798-1805), attaining much of Madras, Orissa, and
the United Provinces (Ward 1994; Datta 2003). In 1765-1805, Muslim rule also collapsed in
Punjab, falling under Sikh rule. Following British expansion under Wellesley, the British did not
gain more territory for over a decade (Banerjee and Iyer 2005), but by the mid-19th century
Muslim rule collapsed in the northern and western areas, including the United Provinces, Central
Provinces, and Sind (which would become a part of northwestern Bombay province in 1843)
(Robinson 1982). The map presented in Figure 2 details when and where Muslim rule collapsed
throughout the subcontinent.
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There is a substantial literature speculating on the reasons underlying the decline of the Mughal Empire. We have
no intention on entering this debate. For more, see Habib (1963), Pearson (1976), and Leonard (1979).
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We exploit the significant variation in the date of collapse both within and across
provinces to test the implications of the argument spelled out above. We construct a dummy
variable for the three periods of Muslim collapse associated with different periods of British
intrusion, as delineated by Robinson (1982, p. 59, 113): pre-1765, 1765-1805, and post-1805.30
Table 4 reports the findings on Hindu and Muslim literacy controlling for the collapse dummies
and the set of socio-economic variables used in Table 3. The omitted collapse dummy is the pre1765 dummy, so all coefficients should be interpreted relative to districts in which Mughal
power collapsed prior to 1765.
A number of patterns emerge in Table 4. First, the fraction Muslim coefficient is
insignificant in all of the regressions in Table 4 where Muslim literacy is the dependent variable,
indicating that including controls for the period of Muslim collapse may pick up what fraction
Muslim picked up in previous regressions. Second, the coefficients on the dummies for our
Muslim collapse variables are negative and significant in all Muslim literacy regressions and the
post-1805 collapse dummy is always more negative than the 1765-1805 dummy. This suggests
that a more recent collapse is negatively associated with Muslim literacy. All else being equal, a
post-1805 collapse of Muslim power entails between a 1.4 and 3.8 percentage point drop in
Muslim literacy (relative to a pre-1765 collapse). This difference is far from trivial, as mean
literacy rates hovered around six to seven percent in this period. The collapse dummies,
however, are rarely significant in regressions on Hindu literacy, especially when province fixed
effects are employed. This result suggests that the effect of late collapse does not simply hurt all
30

These breakpoints separate dates of major British intrusion into India. It is possible that the British expanded to
the most economically profitable areas first, meaning that the collapse dummies are also proxying for income
instead of just the institutional relationship suggested by the model. However, this potential problem should not
affect our results. Stokes (1973) argues that the British expanded after 1765 to gain control and increase the
efficiency of the tax system, which was defunct in much of the continent. Moreover, another exogenous source of
heterogeneity is that the British were not the only non-Muslim group taking Muslim lands – Hindus and Sikhs also
siphoned off much of what has once been the Mughal Empire.
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types of literacy (through some mechanism not controlled for), but only Muslim literacy (as
predicted by the model).
Our model suggests that the effects of Muslim collapse operated through a larger
presence of religious schools in districts where Muslim rule collapsed more recently and a
smaller presence of state schools created under colonial authority. Although the censuses do not
provide any information on the number of schools in a district, we have pieced together some
data from the Indian district gazetteers on total schools, state schools established under the new
British education system (namely public, aided and unaided schools), and indigenous private
schools. Most of the Muslim religious schools were enumerated under the indigenous schools but
unfortunately the data on religious indigenous schools is not differentiated by religion, which
introduces significant measurement error. Moreover, we only have this data for districts of
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Madras, and Punjab in 1911.
Using this crude data, Table 5 provides some suggestive evidence that districts where
Muslim rule collapsed in the early 19th century (late collapse) had fewer total schools, especially
fewer schools established under colonial authority (state schools). This result arises in spite of
the result that, as colonial policy dictated, areas with more Muslims had more public schools and
more total schools. There is also mild evidence that areas with a later collapse had a larger
number of unrecognized religious schools but the effects are not precisely estimated (columns 5
and 6). Since we have limited variation in the timing of collapse within provinces – most of the
intra-province variation on collapse occurs within Punjab, Bombay, Central Provinces, and
United Provinces, and we only have data for the former two – the effects of collapse are
imprecisely estimated in the province fixed effects regressions although the signs on the
coefficients are generally in the direction we expect.

30

The collapse dummies are an admittedly crude proxy for the pathway by which the
legitimizing relationship between religious and political authorities ultimately culminated in the
propagation of religious schools, which discouraged literacy. There are numerous cultural,
economic, religious, and military phenomena associated with the collapse of Muslim power that
are not associated with the pathway proposed in the model. Yet, for such phenomena to have had
a salient impact on Muslim literacy, one would have to explain why it affected only Muslim
literacy and not Hindu literacy, as is suggested by Table 4. We view the use of this proxy as a
successful first-order attempt at showing that broader, institutional features may underlie the
diverging paths of human capital accumulation between groups rather than purely cultural
factors. Though there are other ways that “Muslim collapse” may have affected literacy rates in
the early 20th century, we believe that the institutional pathway that we propose in the model is
the most reasonable one.
VII. BROADER SIGNIFICANCE
Although our analysis focuses on the colonial period, differences in Hindu and Muslim
literacy have continued to persist into the post-independence period. As of the 2001 census,
Muslim literacy averaged 59% compared to an all-India average of 65% (Government of India,
2006).31 Moreover, states with a larger share of Muslims appear to have lower Muslim literacy
as compared to states with smaller Muslim populations. Of course, the Indian subcontinent
witnessed numerous changes over the 20th century including independence from colonial rule in
1947, the Partition of India and creation of Pakistan, and the large-scale migration of Muslims
from India to Pakistan. On account of these changes, we are hesitant to completely attribute the
differential literacy patterns observed in post-independent India to institutional channels dating

31

Estimates from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) find larger differences in 2004-05: Muslim
literacy rate of 60% compared to 80% for Hindus.
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to the collapse of Muslim rule. Our institutional pathway, however, may be one of many factors
responsible for the observed variation in Muslim literacy within post-independence India.
While our focus in this paper has been on the Indian experience, we believe our findings
and model may also be relevant beyond India. A crude examination of literacy rates across the
world reveals a very small negative correlation between the proportion of Muslims and total
literacy rates (Appendix Table 1). But, when we break up countries by regions, the correlation is
negative and larger in magnitude for Asia and Africa but not for the Middle East. The correlation
is also sensitive to whether we break up the sample according to the Muslim population share.
Ideally, we would like to compare Muslim literacy rates to the proportion of Muslims across
countries. However, there are no systematic data on Muslim literacy by country making it
difficult to say whether Muslims or some other group are contributing to the higher total literacy
rate in countries with smaller shares of Muslims. Nonetheless, we believe our model and
mechanism could explain inter-group literacy differences in other countries in Asia or Africa,
where colonial rule supplanted existing political institutions that relied on religious authorities
for legitimacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Differences in human capital accumulation are vital components of differences in broader
economic outcomes both across countries and across different groups within the same country. In
this paper, we attempt to shed light on the conditions under which Muslims (a minority group)
attained less human capital than Hindus (the majority group) in early 20th century India. Are the
factors leading to these differences cultural, institutional, demographic, or something else?
Our baseline specifications suggest that Muslim literacy rates are negatively associated
with the presence of other Muslims in the district. This result is robust to social, economic, and
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educational controls, although adding these controls slightly weakens the result. We argue that
the institutional history of the region played a role in discouraging literacy amongst Muslims.
Our analysis suggests that this history did indeed play a salient role in determining literacy rates,
and that the difference between Hindu and Muslim literacy in the early 20th century may have
been an unintended result of the differential timing of the collapse of Muslim political power.
In sum, we view our paper as a first step in understanding the factors which affect human
capital accumulation across different groups. We offer an alternative to cultural explanations that
rely on the argument, “where there are more Muslims, there are worse economic outcomes.” We
show that controlling for socio-economic variables and particularly institutional variables helps
eliminate the effect of the presence of Muslims on Muslim literacy. More broadly, this analysis
suggests that the “long hand of history” has played some role in subsequent differences in
literacy rates through the persistence of institutions discouraging literacy.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Hindu

Muslim

Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std Dev

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Literacy Rate
Assam
Bengal
Bihar and Orissa
Bombay and Sind
Central Provinces
Madras
Punjab
United Provinces
Population Share
Assam
Bengal
Bihar and Orissa
Bombay and Sind
Central Provinces
Madras
Punjab
United Provinces

410
16
54
42
49
44
50
59
96
410
16
54
42

7.4%
7.0%
11.9%
4.5%
9.2%
4.3%
8.3%
11.5%
3.6%
69.7%
64.9%
46.0%
81.2%

5.6%
2.0%
3.5%
1.4%
5.6%
1.4%
4.7%
9.1%
1.5%
27.3%
13.3%
23.1%
17.3%

396
13
52
38
49
39
50
59
96
410
16
54
42

49
44
50
59
96

71.1%
80.7%
89.0%
33.1%
85.3%

29.3%
13.2%
7.6%
26.5%
8.6%

49
44
50
59
96

6.8%
5.2%
5.8%
5.9%
8.3%
11.9%
12.3%
2.6%
4.6%
23.6%
20.4%
47.4%
9.0%
25.9%
4.2%
6.7%
55.8%
13.7%

5.2%
3.2%
2.8%
3.8%
5.7%
4.2%
6.1%
3.4%
2.8%
26.2%
18.9%
26.5%
8.5%
30.3%
2.7%
6.3%
26.7%
8.0%

1911

1921

Hindu Literacy Rate
Muslim Literacy Rate
Fraction Hindu
Fraction Brahman
Fraction Low Castes
Fraction Muslim
Fraction Christian
Fraction Tribes
Caste and Religious Fragmentation

204
195
204
204
204
204
204
204
204

7.1%
6.2%
69.9%
5.0%
15.8%
23.2%
1.0%
3.7%
0.74

6.2%
4.8%
27.2%
4.3%
8.1%
26.2%
2.0%
9.5%
0.18

206
201
206
206
206
206
206
206
206

7.7%
7.3%
69.4%
5.0%
14.5%
23.9%
1.2%
3.3%
0.73

5.0%
5.6%
27.4%
4.3%
8.3%
26.3%
2.2%
8.5%
0.19

Fraction Urban
Fraction Commercial
Fraction Industry
Fraction Professionals

204
204
204
204

9.9%
7.0%
12.2%
1.6%

10.5%
3.6%
6.3%
0.9%

206
206
206
206

10.9%
6.7%
11.6%
1.6%

11.5%
3.2%
6.4%
1.2%

Income Tax Revenues per-capita

200

0.06

0.10

200

0.20

0.64

Source: Census of India (1911 and 1921) and Imperial District Gazetteer Series (income tax revenues per-capita variable).
See text for more details on dataset.
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TABLE 2: TOTAL LITERACY RATES

Fraction Hindu
Fraction Muslim

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Hindu

Muslim

Hindu

Muslim

-0.054*
[0.028]
0.085***
[0.023]

-0.036
[0.030]
-0.126***
[0.028]

1911 CROSS-SECTION
-0.056*
-0.047
[0.030]
[0.032]
0.095***
-0.141***
[0.020]
[0.033]

Province FE

No

No

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adj. R-squared

204
0.39

195
0.28

204
0.45

195
0.50

0.009
[0.015]
0.124***
[0.017]

-0.025
[0.030]
-0.135***
[0.028]

Fraction Hindu
Fraction Muslim

1921 CROSS-SECTION
0.001
-0.073*
[0.013]
[0.037]
0.127***
-0.184***
[0.015]
[0.038]

Province FE

No

No

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adj. R-squared

206
0.43

201
0.30

206
0.59

201
0.52

Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 3: CAN LOW RETURNS OR COLONIAL POLICIES EXPLAIN THE
PATTERNS?
TOTAL LITERACY RATES

Fraction Hindu
Fraction Muslim

Observations
Adj. R-squared

Fraction Hindu
Fraction Muslim

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Hindu

Muslim

Hindu

Muslim

-0.049
[0.177]
0.011
[0.169]

-0.003
[0.035]
-0.141***
[0.049]

189
0.51

185
0.66

0.018
[0.051]
0.072
[0.059]

-0.015
[0.040]
-0.180***
[0.054]

1911 CROSS-SECTION
-0.047
0.079***
[0.175]
[0.029]
0.015
-0.077*
[0.161]
[0.042]
189
0.52

185
0.56

1921 CROSS-SECTION
0.051
0.039
[0.055]
[0.029]
0.116*
-0.135***
[0.064]
[0.047]

Observations
Adj. R-squared

187
0.75

186
0.58

187
0.80

186
0.68

Province FE
Education Expenditures
Social Controls
Development Controls

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Social controls include the population share of christians, tribes, buddhists and CRFI. Development controls
include income taxes per-capita, urbanization rate, a dummy for coastal districts, population share supported by
commerce, population share supported by industry and population share supported by professionals. We
control for public educational expenditures per-capita incurred by the rural district boards in all the
specifications.
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TABLE 4: DOES YEARS SINCE MUGHAL COLLAPSE AFFECT LITERACY?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Hindu
Muslim
Hindu
Muslim
Fraction Hindu
Fraction Muslim
1765-1805 Collapse
Post-1805 Collapse

Observations
Adj. R-squared

Fraction Hindu
Fraction Muslim
1765-1805 Collapse
Post-1805 Collapse

1911 CROSS-SECTION
-0.059
0.106***
[0.183]
[0.030]
0.003
-0.042
[0.168]
[0.042]
0.008
-0.015**
[0.010]
[0.006]
0.003
-0.025***
[0.007]
[0.005]
186
0.52

182
0.59

1921 CROSS-SECTION
0.074
0.102***
[0.057]
[0.033]
0.150**
-0.052
[0.066]
[0.049]
-0.011**
-0.024***
[0.005]
[0.006]
-0.013***
-0.035***
[0.005]
[0.006]

-0.091
[0.206]
-0.042
[0.202]
0.016
[0.018]
0.014
[0.011]

0.045
[0.043]
-0.080
[0.059]
-0.014*
[0.007]
-0.023***
[0.008]

186
0.51

182
0.67

0.007
[0.053]
0.059
[0.063]
0.001
[0.006]
0.005
[0.006]

0.061
[0.043]
-0.077
[0.061]
-0.022***
[0.008]
-0.038***
[0.009]

Observations
Adj. R-squared

184
0.78

183
0.64

184
0.81

183
0.70

Province FE
Education Expenditures
Social Controls
Development Controls

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Social and development controls are same as in table 3. Collapse dummies equal one if Mughal rule
collapsed in the period.
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TABLE 5: FEWER STATE SCHOOLS AND MUSLIM COLLAPSE
(1)

(2)

Total Schools

Fraction Hindu

(3)

(4)

All State Schools
(Public, Aided and
Unaided)

(5)

(6)

Unrecognized
Indigeneous
Schools

2.184***
[0.441]
1.677***
[0.598]
-0.107*
[0.060]
-0.266***
[0.087]

0.849**
[0.374]
0.274
[0.556]
-0.037
[0.063]
-0.036
[0.088]

1.940***
[0.464]
1.525**
[0.607]
-0.154***
[0.056]
-0.313***
[0.074]

0.427
[0.324]
-0.269
[0.505]
-0.047
[0.056]
-0.016
[0.078]

0.244
[0.155]
0.152
[0.186]
0.047**
[0.021]
0.047
[0.039]

0.422***
[0.145]
0.542***
[0.170]
0.011
[0.021]
-0.020
[0.036]

Province FE
Social Controls
Income Controls
Development Controls

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

120
0.42

120
0.57

120
0.45

120
0.63

120
0.28

120
0.46

Fraction Muslim
1765-1805 Collapse
Post-1805 Collapse

Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Data for 1911 cross-section only. Specifications on public schools and recognized private schools are for districts in
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Madras and Punjab. This data was unreported for the other provinces. Social controls include
the population share of christians, tribes, buddhists and CRFI. Development controls include income taxes per-capita, urbanization
rate, a dummy for coastal districts, population share supported by commerce, population share supported by industry and
population share supported by professionals.
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FIGURE 2: COLLAPSE OF MUSLIM RULE IN INDIA

Source: Robinson (1982)
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Fraction
Literacy Rate
Muslim

Country
Africa (correlation = -0.17)
Algeria
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Liberia
Libya
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda

Literacy Data
Year

75.39
40.54
28.73
67.90
48.57
31.76
77.28
48.73
66.37
52.51
35.90
86.17
65.03
29.48
73.61
55.55
86.78
71.79
26.18
55.80
87.41
55.58
44.38
28.67
72.01
41.89
38.10
60.93
72.31
53.16
77.70
73.60

98.0
24.4
59.0
17.9
8.9
55.8
98.3
36.7
94.6
36.5
33.9
9.5
15.9
84.4
7.0
12.2
96.6
12.8
92.5
99.1
16.6
99.0
22.8
98.6
50.4
96.0
71.3
71.3
30.2
12.2
99.5
12.1

2007
2007
2007
2001
2000
2007
2007
2000
2006
2002
2004
2007
2007
2003
2000
2007
2007
2007
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2005
2007
2006
2007
2000
2007
2000
2007
2007

Middle East (correlation = 0.09)
Bahrain
88.8
Iran
82.3
Iraq
74.1
Jordan
91.1
Kuwait
94.5
Lebanon
89.6
Oman
84.4
Qatar
93.1
Saudi Arabia
85.0
Syria
83.1
United Arab Emirates
90.0
Yemen
58.9

81.2
99.4
16.7
98.2
95.0
59.3
87.7
77.5
97.0
92.2
76.2
99.1

2007
2006
2000
2005
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2005
2007

Asia (correlation = -0.26)
Afghanistan
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Brunei
India
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Mongolia
Pakistan
Philippines
Russia
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

99.7
99.2
89.6
67.2
13.4
88.2
56.4
86.3
5.0
96.3
5.1
11.7
14.9
8.5
84.1
5.8
98.0
93.1
96.3

2000
2007
2007
2007
2007
2006
2007
2007
2007
2006
2007
2007
2007
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2000

28.00
99.50
53.48
94.9
66.02
91.98
99.62
99.30
97.77
54.15
93.57
99.52
94.43
90.81
99.64
94.15
88.7
99.51
96.90

Source: Countries with at least 5% Muslim population (min 100,000); Population from Pew
Research Center (2009); Literacy from World Bank (2009).
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